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COMMENT
The Wilderness Act of 1964: Where Do We Go From
Here?
The signing of the Wilderness Act1 into law on September 3,
1964, marked the beginning of a new era for wilderness conservationists. The Act established a National Wilderness Preservation
System (NWPS) initially encompassing 54 wilderness areas covering some 9.3 million acres in 10 Western state^.^ The Act provided guidelines for the usage of the lands within the system, and
established procedures for reviewing over 220 additional units of
land for possible inclusion within the next 10 years.
This comment will evaluate the continuing viability of the
Wilderness Act in light of the more than 11 years which have
elapsed since its passage. Following a brief historical overview
and a synopsis of the provisions of the Act, the comment examines some of the problems encountered in the application of the
guidelines for inclusion of additional lands. A short statistical
abstract of the present composition of the NWPS will then be
presented. Next, a discussion of the difficulties encountered in
administering lands under the Act's vaguely defined wilderness
concept will be presented, followed by an analysis of the need to
change the present wilderness concept. The comment concludes
with some specific suggestions for amending the Act to eliminate
several of its present inconsistencies and to provide a two-tiered
system for accomodating both pure wilderness areas and areas
which would allow limited commercial exploitation.

The early American settlers had little need for a wilderness
preservation act. Their biggest problem was how to tame the
1. 16 U.S.C. § § 1131-36 (1970).
WILDERNESS
MAGAZINE
41 (1975).
2. The Wilderness System, 41 LIVING
3. For a more fully developed historical account of the background and history of the
wilderness preservation movement in America and of the Wilderness Act of 1964, see R.
NASH,WILDERNESS
AND THE AMERICAN
MIND(rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as NASH];
J. SUNDQUIST,
POLITICS
AND POLICY:
THEEISENHOWER,
KENNEDY,
AND JOHNSON
YEARS
(1968)
McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Back[hereinafter cited as SUNDQUIST];
ground and Meaning, 45 ORE.L. REV. 288, 289-301 (1966) [hereinafter cited as McCloskey]; Mercure & Ross, The Wilderness Act: A Product of Congressional Compromise, in
CONGRESS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mercure].
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wilderness. As the natural environment began to disappear, however, wilderness began to represent to increasing numbers of "believers" a meaningful touchstone to America's past.4 In short,
what was once a challenge to conquer became a challenge to
preserve.
An overview of the important developments leading up to the
passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964 logically begins in 1900,5
when the city of San Francisco proposed the construction of a
dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley located in Yosemite National
Park.' The people of San Francisco were in need of a fresh water
supply, and city planners saw the Tuolomne River in the Hetch
Hetchy Valley as an ideal location for the erection of a dam.7 A
small but dedicated group of conservationists viewed the matter
differently, characterizing the valley in its natural state as a
"public playground" which should not be defiled. The proponents
of the dam and reservoir argued that San Francisco's need for an
adequate fresh water supply should certainly take priority over a
chimerical wish to preserve the wilderness. The preservationists
countered by suggesting alternative water sources and describing
in graphic detail the senselessness of replacing the high walls,
rugged cliffs, and meandering river of the Hetch Hetchy Valley
4. McCloskey 290-92. McCloskey suggests five reasons why the early settlers of our
country valued the wilderness: (1) the wilderness was a challenge to those who explored
and settled it; (2) "[tlhe powerful presence of nature in the wilderness served as an aid
to religion and as a setting for religious experiences"; (3) wilderness was viewed as a
setting for political reform; (4) "wilderness served as a refuge or sanctuary"; (5) the need
to preserve the wilderness was stressed in literature which sounded alarms about the
"depletion of natural resources and massive wastage." Id. McCloskey also lists six reasons
why modem day preservationists seek to conserve wilderness regions: (1) wilderness is
regarded as a national heritage; (2) wilderness is regarded as an important setting for
scientific research in the biological sciences; (3) maintenance of wilderness is evidence of
an intent to meet ethical obligations (man should exercise self-restraint in the extent to
which he disturbs the rest of nature); (4) wilderness today is valued as an opportunity for
an educational experience; (5) wilderness is valuable for therapeutic reasons; (6) wilderness is regarded as "the optimum setting for many sport forms of highest quality." Id. a t
292-94.
5. This is not to say that earlier efforts to protect the wilderness had not been made.
For example, Yosemite National Park was created in 1864 and Yellowstone National Park
in 1872.
6. For interesting discussions of the Hetch Hetchy controversy see H. JONES,JOHN
MUIRAND THE SIERRA
CLUB85-169 (1965); Richardson, The Struggle for the Valley: California's Hetch Hetchy Controversy, 1905-1913, 38 CALIF.HISTORICAL
SOC'YQ. 249-58 (1959).
7. City engineers had considered damming the narrow end of the valley since the
1880's but were temporarily forced to abandon this proposal when the Act creating Yosemite National Park designated the Hetch Hetchy Valley a "wilderness preserve." The
impetus needed to revive the argument for the erection of a dam came in April 1906 when
the San Francisco f i e and earthquake "added urgency and public sympathy to the search
for an adequate water supply." NASH161.
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with an unsightly re~ervoir.~
A long series of debates and public
and congressional hearings ensued,' but when the dust finally
settled more than 13 years after the city's original recommendation, Congress had voted to approve the city's proposal.1°
The preservationists' loss in the Hetch Hetchy controversy
by no means totally defeated their cause. For the first time in
American history, wilderness preservation had become an issue
of national prominence. Moreover, the controversy had identified
the positions and constituencies of the opposing factions and had
demonstrated the need for careful organization and planning in
place of sporadic emotional outcries. On one side was a small but
highly motivated group of preservationists sharing the common
belief that the natural environment must in some degree be preserved for future generations.ll On the other side were the lumbering, mining, irrigation, and livestock interests, who viewed the
wilderness as another area for commercial development, l2 and the
recreationists, who saw the wilderness areas as excellent places to
8. Id. a t 161-70. For a more detailed account of the various tactics used and arguments advanced by both sides of the Hetch Hetchy controversy see id. a t 162-79.
9. Id. at 162-79. The two schools of thought over the controversy are illustrated by
the following statements;
As to my attitude regarding the proposed use of Hetch Hetchy by the city of
San Francisco . . . I am fully persuaded that . . . the injury . . . by substituting a lake for the present swampy floor of the valley . . . is altogether unimportant compared with the benefits to be derived from its use as a reservoir. Gifford
Pinchot, 1913.
These temple destroyers, devotees of ravaging commercialism seem to have a
perfect contempt for nature, and instead of lifting their eyes to the God of the
Mountains, lift them to the Almighty Dollar. John Muir, 1912.
Id. a t 161.
10. President Woodrow Wilson signed into law the bill authorizing the dam on December 19, 1913. Id. a t 179.
11. The philosophy that certain areas should be preserved in their natural state is
not unique to the 20th century. Toward the end of the middle ages, St. Francis of Assisi
praised God for the natural environment and early philosophers such as Edmund Burke,
Immanuel Kant, and Lord Byron were strong supporters of the worth of pure wilderness.
McCloskey 290. See also E. BURKE,
A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY
INTOTHE ORIGIN
OF OURIDEAS
OF THE SUBLIME
AND THE BEAUTIFUL
(1971). For a modern philosophical viewpoint on the
wilderness preservation issue see Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE
L.J. 205 (1974);
[Ut is satisfying to ground the protection of the environment on our most
national legal institution. The right of our citizens to their history, to the signs
and symbols of their culture, and therefore to some means of protecting and
using their surroundings in a way consistent with their values is as important
as the right to an equally apportioned franchise or to participation in a party
primary. These rights are not to be denied on economic grounds.
Id. a t 267 (footnotes omitted).
12. McCloskey 298.
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camp, fish, water-ski, and sell concession^.^^
The Hetch Hetchy controversy also provided the preservationists with a clearer understanding of the political process and
the ways in which it could be used not only to prevent proposed
developments in wilderness areas on an ad hoc basis, but also to
prevent future encroachments on a much broader scale. As a
result, such prominent preservationists as Aldo Leopold,%obert
Marshall,I5 and Howard Zahniser,I6 together with an increasing
number of preservationist groups,I7 enthusiastically supported
such actions as the Forest Service's decision to set aside and
preserve certain wilderness areas within the National forest^,^^
and the efforts of the National Park Service to prevent logging,
mining, and grazing within the national parks and monument^.'^
The ephemeral nature of these administrative efforts, however,
was not entirely satisfactory. Consequently, the preservationists
turned their efforts toward achieving more permanent legislative
controls in the form of a wilderness bill.
The initial proposals for a wilderness bill in the early 1950's
met with considerable opposition and were generally unsuccessful." Something was needed to generate additional public support for the preservationist cause, and it came in the form of a
proposal to construct a dam on the Green River within Dinosaur
National Monument in Utah.21Like the Hetch Hetchy Valley 50
years before,22the deep, narrow gorge of the Green River was
13. See, e.g., Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 253
N.Y. 234, 170 N.E. 902 (1930), where recreationists as well as commercial enterprises set
forth their views on how part of the wilderness areas in New York should be used.
14. Aldo Leopold was an ecologist to whom much of the success of the preservationist
movement in the first half of the 20th century can be attributed. One of his first major
accomplishments was a successful campaign in the early 1920's for a policy of wilderness
preservation within the National Forest System. See NASH182-99.
15. Marshall founded the Wilderness Society in 1935. Id. a t 200-08.
16. Zahniser figured prominently in the leadership of the preservationist movement
in the legislative battles leading up to the enactment of the Wilderness Act of 1964. Id. a t
219.
17. The Sierra Club (formed in San Francisco in 1892) and the Wilderness Society
(founded in the State of Washington in 1935) were the first two preservationist groups.
Id. a t 132 & 207.
18. SUNDQUIST
336.
19. Id.
20. McCloskey 298.
&
21. For a discussion of the entire Colorado River Storage Project see 0. STRATTON
P. SLROTKIN,
THE ECHOPARKCONTROVERSY
79 (Inter-University Case Program No. 46,
1959).
22. The Hetch Hetchy incident was effectively called upon by the conservationists
to help support their stand. "Before" and "after" photographs were exhibited in a display
which strikingly contrasted the high, green valleys of the pre-dam Hetch Hetchy Valley
with the muddy, barren banks of the artificial reservoir. NASH215.
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attractive to both reclamationists and preservationists. Since
many other wilderness areas were threatened by commercial exploitation at the time,23the Echo Park Dam proposal provided a
focal point for national attention and a forum for airing the positions of the opposing sides.24Although the furor raised over the
Echo Park Dam did not immediately result in the passage of a
national wilderness bill, the fact that the Colorado River Storage
Project finally approved by Congress in 195625did not include the
proposed dam was itself a major achievement for the preservationists.
From the Dinosaur National Monument victory, the preservationists reaffirmed their drive for congressional action to establish a national wilderness system. The movement gained substantial ground in 1956 when Senator Hubert Humphrey inserted a
speech given by Howard Zahniser, then executive director of the
Wilderness Society, into the Congressional Record.16 Replies to
and the result was the inthe speech were generally fa~orable,~'
23. Nash describes the situation as follows:
Dams were pending in both Glacier and Grand Canyon National Parks. Los
Angeles had designs on Kings Canyon, wildest of the National Parks which the
Sierra Club unsuccessfully sought to have named in John Muir's honor, for a
source of municipal water supply. In the East, the Adirondack State Park's
status as wilderness was in jeopardy from plans for dams on the Moose River a t
Panther and Higley Mountains.
Id. at 210.
24. The conservationists mounted a massive campaign. As Nash points out:
Appealing to the public with flyers, articles, editorials, and open letters, they
succeeded in arousing a storm of protest. The House mail showed a ratio of those
who would keep Dinosaur wild to those in favor of the dam of eighty to one.
Id. at 216. Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah provided a good example of the ambivalence
of many of the individuals involved with the controversy when he stated:
I am as much interested in beauty, in rugged scenery and preservation of nature's great wonders [as anyone] . . . but I want to point out . . . that to my
mind, beautiful farms, homes, industries and a high standard of civilization are
equally desirable and inspiring.
Id. a t 211. "Speaker Rayburn said in 1954 that Congressmen had received more mail in
337. Numerous
protest against Echo Park Dam than on any other subject." SUNDQUIST
pamphlets and articles were distributed and a professional motion picture was made to
educate the public concerning the detrimental effects of the proposal on the environment.
The movement received national attention through popular periodicals and had the backing of 78 national and 236 state conservation organizations. Id.
25. NASH219. A sentence in the Colorado River Storage Project bill states: "[Nlo
dam or reservoir constructed under the authorization of the Act shall be within any
AND P. SIROTKIN,
THEECHOPARK
National Park or Monument." Id. See also 0.STRATTON
79 (Inter-University Case Program No. 46, 1959).
CONTROVERSY
337.
26. SUNDQUIST
27. Id.
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troduction of the first wilderness bill (S. 4013) in June of 1956.2R
The proposed bill was met by strong opposition from such
commercial groups as the American Pulpwood Association, the
American National Cattleman's Association, and the American
Mining Association, who felt that the proposal would either exclude them from wilderness areas entirely or severely restrict
their use of these areas. The bill was also opposed by groups of
recreationists who feared the exclusion of camping and related
activities from wilderness areas.29Surprisingly, the Forest Service
and the National Park Service were also opposed to the proposal,
which they saw as an attempt to limit their authority to administer the lands within their control.30The heavy lobbying pressure
mounted by these interests resulted in the defeat of the initial
wilderness proposal^,^' and the Multiple Use Act of 196032was
largely a result of compromise over the passage of a satisfactory
wilderness
In 1961, the preservationist movement gained substantial
support when President Kennedy endorsed a proposed wilderness
bill.34The net result was that the ensuing congressional debates
focused primarily on compromises over the authority to add lands
to the wilderness system, the status of mining and other commercial activities in wilderness areas, and the initial amount of land
to be included in the system, rather than on whether the bill
should be passed a t all." The bill which finally received Senate
approval in 1961," however, was radically altered by the House
Interior Committee under the leadership of Representative
Wayne Aspinall of color ad^,^^ and died in committee upon ad28. For a discussion of the important Senate and House bills dealing with wilderness
preservation see McCloskey 298; Mercure 53.
29. NASH241.
30. McCloskey 298; Mercure 53-54. Sundquist quotes a senior forest official as saying,
338.
"It hurt our pride, to suggest that we had to have our hands tied by law." SUNDQUIST
31. Mercure 52.
32. 16 U.S.C. § § 528-31 (1970). The Act designated multiple use and sustained yield
as firm objectives in the administration of national forest lands and stressed the propriety
of preserving the natural environment to the fullest possible extent. Id. 5 529.
33. McCloskey 299; Mercure 52.
34. McCloskey 299.
35. Mercure 55.
36. Id. at 57.
37. Representative Aspinall, chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, represented the views of most western legislators whose constituents included
substantial mining, timber, and grazing interests. These congressmen were opposed to a
concept of wilderness preservation which would preclude such activities in wilderness
areas. Aspinall was also opposed to the presidential authority clauses in several of the
early bills introduced to his committee. For a more detailed account of the political history
of the bill see id. a t 57-59.
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journment of the House in 1962. In 1963 another wilderness bill
was passed by the Senate only to again meet opposition in the
House Interior and Insular Affairs C ~ r n m i t t e eRealizing
.~~
that a
wilderness bill would never be passed if concessions were not
made,39the preservationists agreed to many of the House Interior
Committee's demands in exchange for debate on the floor of the
House where considerable support for the bill e x i ~ t e d . ~ " ~a
result, the bill passed the House and was subsequently signed
into law by President Lyndon Johnson on September 3, 1964?

The provisions of the 1964 Wilderness Act limited the group
of lands which could be designated as wilderness to national
forest lands previously classified as "wilderness," "wild,"
4
canoe," and "primitive," and to "roadless" areas of more than
5,000 contiguous acres in national parks, monuments, wildlife
refuges, and game ranges.43 Wilderness, wild, and canoe areas
automatically became part of the National Wilderness Preservation System (NWPS) upon the effective date of the Act," while
primitive and roadless areas were to be reviewed by the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to determine their suitability
for future inclusion in the NWPS.45The conclusions of the Secretaries were to be submitted to the President, who, in turn, was
to make recommendations concerning the lands to Congress for
final approval.46Also open to presidential recommendation were
"any contiguous area[s] of national forest lands predominantly
6

38. McCloskey 300.
39. ~ e ~ a r d i nthe
; concessions made by the preservationists, Mercure states:
[I]n the fall of 1963 it became obvious to the preservationists that time and
the realities of congressional power were against them and that it was better to
get some protection rather than none a t all. It was also recognized that while
they had to invest huge amounts of money in an attempt to arouse the public,
the opposition had friends of long standing in Congress who could block the
measure forever.
Mercure 58.
40. Id.
41. 16 U.S.C. 9 0 1131-36 (1970).
42. It should be noted that this section does not contain an exhaustive discussion of
all of the provisions of the Wilderness Act, but rather focuses only on those sections
relevant to this comment.
43. 16 U.S.C. 9 1132(a)-(c)(1970).
44. Id. 4 1132(a). The only canoe area was the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in
Minnesota. As of the effective date of the Act there existed 53 wilderness and wild areas.
275, 278 (1974).
Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV.AFFAIRS
45. 16 U.S.C. 4 1132(b)-(c)(1970).
46. Id.
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of wilderness value."47The President was required to submit recommendations on one-third of the designated lands within 3
years, on two-thirds of the lands within 7 years, and on all remaining lands within 10 years.48
In general, lands designated as wilderness areas are to be free
from commercial enterprises, roads, any form of motorized or
mechanized transport, and all manmade structure^.^^ Economic
interest groups, however, were successful in obtaining numerous
exceptions to these strict proscriptions regarding land use within
national forest wilderness areas. First, where already established,
use of aircraft and motorboats may continue.50Second, mineral
prospecting is allowed as long as it is conducted in a manner
Third, mining and minconsistent with wilderness pre~ervation.~'
eral leasing laws will generally continue to apply until December
31, 1983.52Fourth, water and power projects are permissible under
some circumstances, and previously established grazing uses may
be continued." Fifth, regulations governing the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area in Minnesota, though less stringent than the strict
provisions of the Wilderness Act, are to remain in effect.54Sixth,
commercial services necessary to the realization of recreational
and other wilderness purposes are permitted.55In light of these
exceptions, the efficacy of the Act in preserving the wilderness
characteristics of areas included within the NWPS is to a large
extent dependent upon the manner in which the Departments of
Agriculture and the Interior, the President, and Congress carry
out their discretionary responsibilities.

A.

Guidelines for Inclusion of Additional Lands

The Wilderness Act provided very few guidelines for the De47. The provision of the Wilderness Act pertaining to contiguous areas states:
Nothing herein contained shall limit the President in proposing, as part of his
recommendations to Congress, the alteration of existing boundaries of primitive
areas or recommending the addition of any contiguous area of national forest
lands predominantly of wilderness value.
Id. $ 1132(b).
48. Id. 4 1132(b)-(c).
49. Id. $ 1133(c).
50. Id. 4 1133(d)(l).
51. Id. 4 1133(d)(2).
52. Id. 4 1133(d)(3).
53. Id. $ 1133(d)(4).
54. Id. 4 1133(d)(5).
55. Id. 4 1133(d)(6).
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partments of Agriculture and the Interior in their review of lands
designated for possible inclusion in the NWPS. Apparently,
Congress was confident that these departments would promulgate their own guidelines and procedures in conformity with the
Act's general wilderness concept. The criticisms leveled against
both the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior during
however, would suggest
the 11 years since passage of the
that this congressional confidence was misplaced for at least two
reasons. First, the Act's definition of "wilderness" was not abundantly clear. Second, the departments charged with administering the Act often had objectives and attitudes in conflict with the
While it is true that the
concept of wilderness pre~ervation.~'
President and Congress are not bound by the recommendations
of the departments concerning potential wilderness areas, these
recommendations are generally agreed to be extremely influential, and thus many recent criticisms would have been eliminated
had the Act provided more explicit guidelines for departmental
review.

B. Protection of Potential Wilderness Areas Pending Review
Just as the Act failed to provide specific guidelines for review, it also failed to specify the uses to be permitted in potential
wilderness areas pending review by the departments and recom. ~ ~ problem was
mendations by the President and C o n g r e ~ sThis
-

56. See generally Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV.AFFAIRS
275
(1974).
57. Indeed, one of the factors behind the initial movement for legislative regulation
of this area was the preservationists' concern that administrative discretion was too unpredictable to provide consistency and fairness in the administration of wilderness areas. See
Note, Parker u. United States: The Forest Service Role in Wilderness Preservation, 3
ECOLOGY
L.Q. 145, 147 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Parker v. United States].
58. The Forest Service included its regulations in The Forest Service Manual. A
Roadless Area Review Evaluation (RARE) program was devised which provides for review
of "all roadless areas 5,000 acres or larger in the National Forest System as well as smaller
roadless areas which are contiguous to existing primitive areas or wildernesses." See note
76 and accompanying text infra. The Interior Department attempted to incorporate the
wilderness reviews within its master plan study for all areas in the National Park System.
See generally Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV.AFFAIRS
275, 287
(1974); The Wilderness System, 41 LIVING
WILDERNESS
MAGAZINE
38 (1975).
Many of the areas mandated for review by the Wilderness Act are also protected by
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. $ 9 4321,
4331-35, 4341-47 (1970). See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484
F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(enjoining timber cutting in 55 million acres of "de facto wilderness" until environmental
impact statements were completed). But the protection given by NEPA to potential
wilderness areas is not as complete as that offered by the Wilderness Act. For example,
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discussed in Parker v. United States,59in which a group of concerned preservationists challenged the right of the United States
Forest Service to permit the cutting of timber in an area adjoining
the Gore Range Eagles Nest Primitive Area in color ad^.^^ Since
the area in dispute was contiguous to a primitive area, the plaintiffs contended that it was entitled to review for possible wilderness designation and that no nonwilderness uses could be permitted within the area pending review? The United States District
Court for the District of Colorado agreed and granted an injunction against the cutting of timber in the area on grounds that the
power of the President and Congress to include additional lands
within the NWPS would be jeopardized if the Forest Service were
allowed to impair the wilderness condition of the area before proper review procedures were ~ o m p l e t e d . ~ ~
The district court in Parker recognized that not all areas
contiguous to national forests were intended to be reviewed under
the Act, but only those areas "which seem to have significant
wilderness resour~es?~Accordingly, the court found that the disputed area possessed sufficient wilderness characteristics to merit
its protection against such nonwilderness uses as timber cutting
pending review by the Department of Agriculture? This "minimum suitability" test was not intended to provide the ultimate
criteria for determining whether the area should be designated as
wilderness, but rather was designed to indicate whether the area
possessed sufficient wilderness characteristics to merit its preservation pending review.65
-

environmental impact statements are only required when there exists a major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)
(1970). There are certainly many nonwilderness activities which do not constitute major
federal actions.
59. 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970),a f d , 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert, denied,
405 U.S. 989 (1972).
60. The area was known as the East Meadow Creek Basin and consisted of approximately 3,000 acres. Id. a t 595.
61. Id. a t 594.
62. Id. a t 599. The court found that it was "crystal clear from the evidence that the
consummation of the present sale will effectively take all of East Meadow Creek out of
contention as a primitive or wilderness addition." Id. a t 596.
63. Id. at 599. The District Court applied the Forest Service's own regulations which
state: "Each Primitive Area . . . and contiguous lands which seem to have significant
wilderness resources will be studied . . . . US.D E ~OF
. AGRICULTURE,
FORESTSERVICE
MANUAL
§ 2321(1)." Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. a t 601.
65. The court stated:
However, we are not here concerned with the issue of whether or not the
Forest Service must recommend East Meadow Creek for wilderness classifica-
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On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's order that the Forest Service restudy and include
recommendations concerning the disputed area in its report to
the President? Like the district court, the court of appeals perceived its role in determining the suitability of the area for wilderness preservation as entirely preliminary. As stated by the court:
This requirement [to preserve the area until final determination of its suitability for wilderness preservation] in no way
directs or limits the Secretary in his full discretionary right to
make such recornommendation [sic] to the President as he
may deem proper.67

Thus, the Parker decision made it clear that all lands specified
in the Act for wilderness review, including contiguous lands with
significant wilderness characteristics, would be protected from
nonwilderness uses pending review.
The Parker decision also shed some light on the meaning of
the term "contiguous." In rejecting the contention that the presence of a narrow "bumper" zone" between the area in dispute and
the Gore Range Eagles Nest Primitive Area made the disputed
area noncontiguous, the Tenth Circuit indicated that it is not
crucial that an area share a common boundary with a primitive
region to be classified as contiguous. The Parker decision may be
limited to its specific facts, however, and in the absence of a
definition within the Act itself, the problem of identifying contiguous areas remains unres01ved.~~
tion. Nor would we undertake to second guess the Secretary by a ruling that the
area in question is wilderness.
Id. a t 600.
66. 448 F.2d 793, 797-98 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
67. Id. a t 797. It has been suggested that the circuit court did not clearly use the
"minimum suitability" test set out by the district court. See Note, Parker v. United States
163. It is clear, however, that the circuit court did not intend to make the ultimate decision
regarding the wilderness suitability of the area in dispute.
68. The "bumper" zone was created when the Forest Service reduced the number of
board feet in the contract for the sale of timber in the region, thereby eliminating the lands
immediately adjacent to the primitive area from a direct relationship with the proposed
contract. The court states that "[tlhe preservation of a 'bumper' area does not probe the
basic question presented, merely serves to lessen the impact of the agency action, and does
not justify such action [as timber cutting] if otherwise prohibited." 448 F.2d a t 796.
69. See Note, Parker v. United States 164. The author of the foregoing note suggests
that:
The Service should review the entire scope of the next manageable ecological
unit adjoining a primitive area, excluding that unit or portions of it from study,
report and interim protection only when the impact of man is substantial
enough to preclude the entire area or portion excluded from meeting the
minimum suitability test.
Id.
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Parker also failed to define the point a t which the Forest
Service's duty to protect a contiguous area ends. Although the
injunction continued "until a final determination has been made
by Congress," neither the circuit nor the district court expressly
considered this issue. However, since the President may continue
to make recommendations until final action has been taken by
C o n g r e ~ s it
, ~ would
~
appear only logical that contiguous areas
should be protected as long as there is a possibility for inclusion
in the NWPS.71
C. Lands Not Included
Much of the potentially suitable wilderness land owned by
the Federal Government was not specifically designated for review under the Wilderness
The effect of this omission was
forcefully demonstrated in Sierra Club v. Hardin,73in which the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska held that
an estimated 1,090,000 acres of Forest Service land possessing
obvious wilderness characteristics were not entitled to protection
under the Wilderness Act because:
The Act expressly provides that "no Federal lands shall be
designated as 'wilderness areas' except as provided for in this
chapter or by subsequent Act." 16 U.S.C. 5 1131(a) (Supp.
1970). Since there were no "primitive" areas in Alaska on September 3, 1964, and it does not appear that the sale includes any
land within a national park, wildlife refuge or game range, the
Wilderness Act has no application here.74
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b)-(c) (1970).
71. Predictably, the Forest Service chose to read the Parker decision narrowly. The
"minimum suitability" language of the district court was rejected in favor of "predominantly of wilderness value" criteria in departmental memoranda issued subsequent to the
Parker decision. Note, Parker u. United States 168. Also, "in a recent administrative
ruling of the Department of Agriculture [the Forest Service] indicated that it would
refuse to follow Parker outside the 10th Circuit." Id. a t 168 n.105. Despite this narrow
interpretation of Parker by the Forest Service, the decision already has had some statutory
effect and placed conservationists in a better position a t the bargaining table. Id. a t 16869.
72. No provision was made, for example, for the review of lands under the control of
the Bureau of Land Management, the Government's largest land supervisor. It would thus
appear that the Act, which many conservationists had hoped would provide a comprehensive system for wilderness preservation, has forgotten one rather essential ingredientland.
73. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971).
74. Id. at 124. The problem pointed out in Hardin has been partially eliminated in
Alaska by the establishment of huge park and wildlife reservations within the National
Park System pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § § 1601
et. seq. (Supp. 1970).
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As a result of this failure to explicitly provide for review of
all potentially suitable lands, it is necessary to turn to a rather
obscure section of the Act to find some authority for including
lands not specifically designated for review within the NWPS.
Section 6 of the Act allows the Secretaries of Agriculture and the
Interior to make recommendations in their annual reports to Congress concerning "any" areas deemed suitable for wilderness pressuch recommendations are completely dise r ~ a t i o nAlthough
.~~
cretionary, it appears that the departments have not totally ignored their authority to review lands other than those specifically
designated in the Act. The Forest Service has implemented a
"Roadless Area Review and Evaluation" program which provides
for review of "all roadless areas 5,000 acres or larger in the National Forest System as well as smaller roadless areas which are
contiguous to existing Primitive Areas or Wilderne~ses."~VI'he
Interior Department has also implemented a program to review
Similarly, Congress
all areas with possible wilderness p~tential.'~
on its own initiative has occasionally designated areas as wilderness which have not been set aside for review by the
Thus, although the Act does not explicitly provide'for review
of all lands with wilderness potential, it appears that a t least
some areas not designated for review by the Act are receiving
attention through administrative and legislative action. It nevertheless seems anomalous that such actions should be necessary
to bring areas with significant wilderness characteristics into the
NWPS. This criticism does not necessarily imply that more lands
should be included within the wilderness system, but only that
it may be more beneficial to initially provide for the study of all
potentially suitable lands so that when the optimum amount of
wilderness acreage has been set aside, that acreage will include
the areas best suited for p r e s e r ~ a t i o n . ~ ~
75. 16 U.S.C. 5 1136 (1970).
CI REPORTNO. 11, NEWWILDERNESS
STUDYAREAS,a t 2
76. U.S. FORESTSERVICE
(1973).
77. The Point Reyes National Seashore Wilderness Area, comprising more than
10,000 acres of California seashore including several "roaded" areas, is an example of the
additional areas being considered by the Interior Department. See Buell, The Wilderness
Act and the National Wildlife Refuges and Ranges, in WILDERNESS
AND THE QUALITY
OF
LIFE6, 26-27 (1969).
78. An example of a congressionally initiated wilderness area is the Sawtooth Wilderness Area in Idaho. See Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV.AFFAIRS
275,
284-85 (1974).
79. For a discussion concerning the concept of an optimal amount of wilderness
acreage see notes 146-48 and accompanying text infra.
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IV. WHAT'SBEENDONE~O
Since passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964, some 144 areas
totaling more than 13 million acres in the National Forest, National Park, and National Wildlife Refuge Systems have been
added to the National Wildlife Preservation System through congressional enactments. As of January 1, 1976, 104 wilderness
areas in the national forestsu1and 40 wilderness areas in the national parks and national wildlife refuges had been created.R2
When the Act was passed in 1964, 34 primitive areas within
the National Forest System were mandated for review. All 34
have now been studied by the Forest Service under the direction
of the Secretary of Agriculture. Sixteen of these areas have been
incorporated into the NWPS, while the 18 remaining areas await
congressional action.u3The Act also required the Department of
the Interior to review 186 areas in the National Park System, the
National Wildlife Refuges, and the Migratory Bird Refuges for
wilderness suitability. As of January 1, 1976, 40 units involving
over 750,000 acres had been added to the NWPSu4and 112 units
comprising 10.5 million additional acres had been reviewed and
await congressional action?
The above figures indicate that the reviews mandated by the
Wilderness Act have been accomplished in reasonable proximity
to the Act's 10-year deadline. To be sure, the start was slow, with
only 8 areas finding their way into the NWPS in the first 6 years,
but the finish has been strong with 48 units being added in 1974
alone? It may also be noted that no deadlines were set for congressional action and over 110 areas which have received departmental review now await final approval.87
It would therefore appear that the Act has worked admirably
well. Although there may be disagreement as to whether too little
or too much acreage was finally included in wilderness areas, the
80. Statistics in this section were obtained from The Wilderness System, 41 LIVING
38 (1975) and from information received from the Department of
WILDERNESS
MAGAZINE
the Interior, the United States Forest Service, and the House and Senate Committees on
Interior and Insular Affairs.
81. See appendix A infra.
82. See appendices BI & CI infra.
MAGAZINE
42 (1975).
83. The Wilderness System, 41 LIVINGWILDERNESS
84. See appendices BI & CI infra.
85. See appendices BII & CII infra.
86. See appendices A, BI, & CI infra. Of course, 54 wilderness areas were included
in the NWPS concurrently with the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964.
87. See appendices BII & CII infra.
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study of the lands designated for review has largely been completed.

The Act's concept of wilderness governs determinations of
which lands are to be included in the NWPS as well as decisions
concerning how those lands are to be administered. Although the
wilderness concept has worked fairly well, at least if lack of litigathere have been some problems
tion is any indication of succe~s,8~
resulting from its vagaries, and increased pressure for future development of wilderness lands could create additional problems
if the concept is not clarified.
The Act includes provisions which alternately illuminate and
cloud the wilderness concept. Section 2(a) indicates that it is the
policy of Congress to "secure for the American people of present
and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of
wilderness" by preserving and protecting lands "in their natural
c o n d i t i ~ n . "Section
~~
2(c), entitled "Definition of Wilderness,"
indicates that wilderness is an area "untrammeled by man, where
man himself is a visitor who does not remain," an area retaining
its "primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural condition^."^^ To this point the
definition unequivocally refers only to lands which are "untrammeled," "primeval, " and "natural. "gl However, section 2(c) also
includes land:
which (1)generally appears to have been affected primarily by
the forces of nature, with t h e imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities
for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3)
has a t least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as
to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired
condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological or
other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical
value .92
88. A survey by the authors of the case law involving the Wilderness Act has revealed
relatively little litigation. However, it must be recognized with respect to environmental
litigation that large legal expenses and the generally nonexistent prospect of financial
reward may tend to discourage potential plaintiffs.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1970).
90. Id. § 1131(c).
91. McCloskey 307.
92. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
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Points (2) through (4) of this definition seem consistent with the
unqualified notion of "natural condition," but point (1)suggests
a more lenient wilderness concept-one watered down by the
qualifiers "generally," "primarily," and "s~bstantially."~~
Although point (1) has been interpreted by the Forest Service to
require a "pristine appearance with no evidence of man's activities w h a t s ~ e v e r , "it~ ~appears that this interpretation is stricter
than Congress intended. Section 4 of the Act, dealing with the use
of wilderness areas, commences with the general rule that "there
shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within
any wilderness area,"g5but goes on to permit several commercial
and recreational uses which would require mechanized transport,96as well as the continuation of previously established grazing a c t i v i t i e ~Thus,
. ~ ~ notwithstanding its definition of wilderness
as an area untrammeled by man, Congress clearly expected less
than purity to prevail in many of the areas included within the
NWPS.
The difficulties in interpreting the wilderness concept have
arisen in deciding how much impurity to allow. Uses such as
grazing, motorboating, and flying light aircraft may be justified
under the Act's wilderness concept because their effects on the
natural environment are relatively limited. However, other uses
permitted under section 4, such as mining and logging, substantially alter the natural conditions of the land and would therefore
appear to be basically incompatible with wilderness preservation .98
The suggestion that mining is incompatible with wilderness
preservation is supported by the legislative history of the wilderness bill.g9The House Report on the bill indicates that "prospecting for mineral or other resources would be allowed if so conducted as to be compatible with the preservation of a wilderness
e n v i r ~ n m e n t . "Yet,
~ ~ ~in a remarkable bit of doubletalk, the Report also explains that "[c]urrently authorized uses that are
incompatible with wilderness preservation should be phased out
over a reasonable period of time"lOl and points out t h a t the
93. McCloskey 307.
94. The Wilderness System, 41 LIVINGWILDERNESS
MAGAZINE
38, 42 (1975).
95. 16 U.S.C. 4 1133(c) (1970).
96. Id. 4 1133(~)-(d).
97. Id. 5 1133(d)(4).
98. See notes 105 & 121 and accompanying text infra.
99. H.R. REP. NO. 1538, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
15381.
100. H.R. REP. 1538 a t 8.
101. Id. a t 9.
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applicability of mining and mineral leasing laws is to be limited
to a period of 25 years.lo2The only possible conclusion that may
be drawn from these statements is that mining would not be
phased out if it were not incompatible with the concept of wilderness.
This conclusion is further supported by the decision in Izaak
Walton League of America v. St. Clair.lo3In St. Clair the defendant, with the permission of the Government, undertook surface
mineral exploration in conjunction with his mineral rights in land
within the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA), a part of the
NWPS. The Izaak Walton League sought an injunction to prevent St. Clair from continuing his operation. In a noteworthy
opinion, Judge Neville of the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota granted the injunction,lo4stating:
A Wilderness purpose plain and simply has to be inconsistent
with and antagonistic to a purpose to allow any commercial
activity such as mining within the BWCA . . . . In this court's
opinion, the Wilderness objectives override the contrary mineral
right provision of the statute (and of necessity the regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto). Otherwise, the Congressional
Act is a nullity. It does not seem to this court that i t can presume that Congress intended a nullity.lo5

Although St. Clair was later reversed on procedural grounds,lo6it
is indicative of probable future constructions of the Wilderness
Act with regard to mining and other uses permitted by the Act
which are inconsistent with wilderness preservation.
Judge Neville's virtual nullification of the provision permitting mining seems to be legitimate. It appears that "the rule now
generally approved is that a proviso which is directly repugnant
to the purview or body of the act is inoperative and void for
102. Id.
103. 353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir.
1974).
104. Id. a t 716.
105. Id. a t 714-15.
106. 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974). The ground for reversal was primary jurisdiction.
The court determined that prior to any further judicial disposition of the case the Forest
Service would have to decide whether or not to issue St. Clair a permit to mine in the
BWCA. As of this writing, St. Clair has not made application for a permit, and thus the
Forest Service has made no ruling. The federal defendants have filed a motion to dismiss
in the district court, arguing that the case is moot given the failure of St. Clair to apply
for a permit. The court has taken no action because neither party has moved to place the
case on the court's calendar. It appears, however, that the mootness contention will not
prevail since the opportunity exists for St. Clair to apply for a permit a t any time in the
future. See generally 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV.181.
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repugnancy. "lo7 As Judge Neville indicates, an extensive mining
operation cannot be conducted in a manner consistent with wilderness preservation.losTherefore, under the above-quoted rule of
construction, the proviso permitting mining becomes inoperative.
Another recently decided case, Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group v. Butz,loQindicates that logging is also incompatible with wilderness preservation.l1° In the first of two suits,
the plaintiffs sought a n injunction prohibiting logging in the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area until all of the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)lll had been satisfied
by the Department of Agriculture and the Forest Service.l12The
plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint seeking a permanent
injunction against logging in the virgin forest areas of the BWCA
based on the express requirement of the Wilderness Act that the
Secretary of Agriculture maintain the primitive character of the
area.l13The defendants claimed that NEPA must be construed in
light of the special Wilderness Act provision concerning the
BWCA which required it to be administered "without unnecessary restrictions on other uses, including that of timber."l14 The
court concluded that a restriction on logging could be challenged
as "unnecessary" only if i t were shown not to be essential to
maintaining the primitive character of the BWCA.l15 The court
held that a permanent injunction against logging in the BWCA
107. 73 AM. JUR.2d Statutes 8 321 (1974). See 82 C.J.S. Statutes
108. As stated in the opinion:

9 381 (1953).

There can be no question but that full mineral development and mining will
destroy and negate the wilderness or most of it. Even any substantial exploratory operation such as core drilling will require a means of ingress and egress, a
communications system of some kind, the establishment of various camp sites,
the importation of food, clothing, etc., power lines and the modification to a
greater or lesser extent of the environemnt. Should minerals be discovered in
commercially productive quantities and be amenable to open pit mining as in
other locations in Minnesota or as in taconite sites, the purpose and values of
almost the entire BWCA is lost. The same is true, but to somewhat lesser degree,
should any mining be done in the conventional underground method. In either
event, access as by railroad or highway is necessary, areas of timber must be
logged off, a water supply must be obtained and other wilderness interferences
effected.
353 F. Supp. a t 714.
109. No. 4-72 Civil 598 (D. Minn., Aug. 13, 1975).
110. Id. a t 94.
111. 42 U.S.C. # $ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970).
112. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 587 (D.
Minn. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
113. Id. a t 587-88.
114. 16 U.S.C. 9 1133(d)(5) (1970).
115. 358 F. Supp. a t 629.
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would be granted if it were shown in an environmental impact
statement, which the Forest Service was ordered to prepare, that
"logging irretrievably destroys the character of the area involved. " l6 The court also enjoined the defendants from logging
"in those areas of the active timber sales on the BWCA which are
contiguous with the main virgin forest areas of the BWCA pending the Forest Service's completion of i t s . . . impact
statement." 117 The appellate court affirmed. 118
Upon completion of the impact statement, plaintiffs brought
a second suit in the district court alleging that the impact statement prepared by the Forest Service did not comply with NEPA
and reasserting the claim that logging would destroy the primitive character of the region.llgThe court found the impact statement to be inadequate.120 This finding would ordinarily require
the court to order further study before issuing a permanent injunction. However, since there was substantial evidence that
"logging in virgin forest areas destroys the primitive character of
the area logged,"121 the court, relying on the provisions of the
Wilderness Act, permanently enjoined logging in the virgin forests and areas contiguous thereto within the BWCA.122Having
granted an injunction against logging pursuant to the Wilderness
Act, the court concluded that further study under NEPA would
be superfluous. 123
The court also denied defendant's counterclaim for a
declaratory judgment that a total proscription of logging within
the BWCA, including previously logged areas,12*would be unlawful under the Wilderness
The court agreed that "logging
within previously logged-over areas does not have as much of an
adverse effect on the primitive character of the area as does log116. Id.
117. Id. a t 630.
118. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
119. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, No. 4-72 Civil 598 a t 2.
120. Id. a t 79-82.
121. Id. a t 94.
122. Id. a t 99.
123. Id. a t 97.
124. Ordinarily logged-over areas would not be included within the NWPS.
[Tlhe special BWCA provision of the Wilderness Act was necessary to afford
the BWCA the same protection as other wilderness areas although the area did
not conform with the statute's proposed definition of wilderness. Past timber
harvesting disqualified the BWCA as a wilderness under the proposed definition
and rather than dilute that definition, the special BWCA provision was written
to include the BWCA within the protection of the Wilderness Act.
Id. a t 87.
125. Id. a t 96.

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

746

[1975:

ging in virgin forest areas,"126but nevertheless concluded that the
disruptive effect of logging even in previously logged areas would
be "sufficient to justify eliminating all BWCA logging a t the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture." 12' Thus, the court also
suggests that even where logging has been established in a wilderness area prior to its inclusion within the NWPS,128continued
logging should be prohibited to allow nature to slowly restore the
wilderness character of the area.
The St. Clair and Butz cases demonstrate that at least two
activities permitted by the special provisions in section 4 of the
Act, i. e. , mining and logging, are incompatible with the wilderness concept and should be disallowed. Other uses mentioned in
section 4 which seem incompatible with wilderness preservation
are: "oil and gas leasing, discovery work, drilling, . . . product i ~ n , " '"prospecting
~~
for water resources, the establishment and
maintenance of reservoirs, water-conservation works, power projects, transmission lines, . . . other facilities needed in the public
interest, including road construction and maintenance essential
to development and use thereof,"130 and "commercial services
. . . to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for
realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the
areas."131
The wilderness concept which governs inclusion and administration of lands within the NWPS has been unclear because of
seemingly contradictory provisions in sections 2 and 4 of the Act.
Section 2 provides a general wilderness definition which requires
lands designated as wilderness to be characterized by essentially
primeval conditions.132Section 4, which prescribes activities permissible in wilderness areas, provides a strict general rule which
appears to be compatible with section 2,133but also contains special provisions allowing uses seemingly incompatible with wilderThe conflicts between these sections can be
ness pre~ervati0n.l~~
resolved, however, by allowing the sections to work together while
emphasizing the Act's overall objective of "securing for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
See note 124 supra.
16 U.S.C. 9 1133(d)(3) (1970).
Id. § 1133(d)(4).
Id. § 1133(d)(6).
Id. 8 1131(c).
Id. § 1133(c).
Id. 5 1133(d).
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enduring resource of wilderness."135Portions of section 4 illustrate
situations in which the section 2 concept may be applied leniently, while section 2 provides general guidelines for constraining
uses permitted under section 4.136For example, section 4 provisions allowing activities which only nominally disturb the wilderness, such as grazing and motor-boating, suggest that absolute
purity is not required by the section 2 definition.13' Still, the
emphasis of section 2 on preservation of natural conditions suggests that commercial enterprises allowed by section 4, such as
mining and logging, should not be permitted if they substantially
alter the wilderness character of lands in which they are undertaken.138By this interpretation some section 4 uses may never be
permissible within the wilderness system. 139

VI. CANA STRICTWILDERNESS
CONCEPT
BE JUSTIFIED?
The courts are required to resolve current inconsistencies in
the Wilderness Act by virtually nullifying certain of its provisions. Congress can remove this responsibility from the courts by
amending the Act to either eliminate uses which are incompatible
with the current wilderness concept, change the concept of wilderness so that presently incompatible uses would be permissible
under its provisions, or adopt a two-tiered wilderness system
which would provide for pure wilderness in some areas and limited commercial development in others. In evaluating the relative
merit of these alternatives, policymakers would probably rely on
a cost-benefit analysis.140This technique evaluates the benefits of
a project to an affected group in terms of the utility provided by
the project (generally measured in dollars)141which would not
135. Id. 5 1131(a).
136. Despite the fact that several special uses permitted by section 4 of the Act clearly
seem to be incompatible with the general wilderness concept which emerges from section
2, some commentators have suggested that section 2 provides lenient criteria for determining whether lands should be included within the NWPS while section 4 contains strict
guidelines for management of lands once they are admitted into the system. The WilderWILDERNESS
MAGAZINE
38, 44 (1975). See Haight, The Wilderness
ness System, 41 LIVING
275, 288 (1974). However, the fact that section 4 uses
Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV.AFFAIRS
discussed above would probably disqualify an area from inclusion within the NWPS under
section 2 criteria casts doubt on this suggestion.
137. See notes 96 & 97 and accompanying text supra.
138. See notes 98-137 and accompanying text supra.
139. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
140. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis techniques see A. HARBERGER,
PROJECT
EVALUATION.
141. Since cost-benefit analysis is a quantitative aid to decisionmaking, it is necessary to use some unit of measure to quantify the costs and benefits being considered in
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accrue to the group but for the project. The costs of the project
are based on the u$ility which would be foregone (again measured
in dollars) as a result of not employing the resources involved in
the project in their next best alternative use.142
All projects entail both present and future benefits and costs.
Since people generally prefer present to future benefits and future
to present costs, the future costs and benefits of a project are
generally "weighted" through a process referred to as "discounting" to approximate their "present" value equivalents. In a project involving decisions affecting the general public, however, it
may be argued that the interests of future generations should be
weighted as heavily as the interests of the present generation,
making the discounting process unnecessary. In any event, once
all costs and benefits of a project in each year have been estimated, the net present value of the project may be calculated-a
positive value indicating that the project is justifiable and a negative value indicating that it should be abandoned.143
This section will suggest factors (both pecuniary and nonpecuniary) which policymakers should consider in performing a
cost-benefit analysis to determine which of the proposed wilderness concepts should be adopted and will conclude with a tentative recommendation for a wilderness concept based on the factors presented.

A . Factors To Be Considered in Performing a Cost-Benefit
A nalysis
For purposes of this discussion, a leniently managed wilderness system will be assumed to be the next best alternative to a
strictly managed system, and no attempt will be made to compare either of these alternatives with a system allowing largethe analysis. This measure usually has been the dollar, which is easily applied to pecuniary benefits and costs, but applied only with difficulty to nonpecuniary benefits and costs.
142. This measurement is referred to as the "opportunity cost" of the project.
143. A common symbolic formulation of a cost-benefit analysis follows:
B, - C, B,

NPV = (B

- C ,)

- C,

+ -+ -------- + ... +
l+r

(l+rlZ

-

C

n
(Bi-Ci)

-

(1+r)"

i=O

(l+r)l

In this equation, B n = benefits in the nth year of the project, Cn = costs in the nth year,
r = discount rate, n = number of years over which the project is to be evaluated, and NPV
= net present value of the project. Benefits and costs are estimated over the life of a
project. An r is chosen which appropriately weights present against future costs and
benefits. If the values of B, C, and r produce NPV >0,then the project should be undertaken. If a public decision is being made, and discounting is felt to be unnecessary, the
discount rate will be zero (r = 0).
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scale commercial development. (For present purposes, a strictly
managed system will be defined as one allowing only pure wilderness uses permitted under the present Act, and a leniently managed wilderness system will be defined as one allowing the incompatible uses permitted under the present Act.) Given this assumption, by performing a cost-benefit analysis of a strict wilderness concept, the merits of strictly and leniently managed systems can be compared. The pecuniary benefits of a strict concept
would be measured primarily in terms of the income which would
be imputed to recreational, educational, and scientific use1" of
strictly managed lands above that which could be imputed to the
same activities in the same lands under a lenient concept. The
pecuniary costs would be the income foregone from such activities
as mining, logging, water reclamation, and power production.lu
A strictly pecuniary cost-benefit analysis of the value of wilderness preservation will result in the conclusion that the creation
of the National Wilderness Preservation System, with wilderness
strictly defined, is justified when pecuniary benefits outweigh
pecuniary costs for the amount of acreage ~ 0 n s i d e r e d . l ~ ~
The magnitude of costs and benefits associated with a wilderness concept is greatly influenced by the relative scarcities of
the goods which can be derived from wilderness lands. Lands
which are potentially includable in the NWPS may be enjoyed
either in a pristine or a commercially developed state. Goods
associated with enjoyment of pristine wilderness will be called
pristine goods. Goods associated with commercial development
will be called commercial goods. Increasing the amount of land
committed to a strictly managed wilderness sytem increases the
amount of pristine goods and decreases the amount of commercial goods available for public consumption. By the law of diminishing returns,14' each additional acre added to a strictly managed
144. These uses are proposed in 16 U.S.C. $ 1131(c)(4) (1970); Id. $ 1133(b). See
generally Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, No. 4-72 Civil 598 a t 44. For
a discussion of the benefits of wilderness preservation see note 4 supra.
145. These uses are mentioned in 16 U.S.C. 6 1133(d) (1970) and are discussed in the
previous section of this comment.
146. The analysis undertaken in this discussion may be represented by the following
equation:
n
NPV=> ( B i - C i )
i=o
B = benefits accruing from strictly managed wilderness. C = benefits accruing from
leniently managed wilderness. n = number of years over which benefits and costs are
expected.
147. According to the law of diminishing returns, each additional unit of a good
consumed, ceteris paribus, provides less utility than the previous unit.
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wilderness system provides the public with fewer benefits than
the previous acre added because it contains pristine goods possessing decreased marginal benefits. At the same time, each additional acre is added with increased costs, since each addition
causes commercial goods possessing increased marginal benefits
to be withheld from consumption. It follows then that if preservation of lands as strictly managed wilderness is justified a t all,
there is some optimal amount of wilderness acreage beyond which
the cost of preservation is greater than the benefit.148
Two commentators, Laurence Tribe and Mark Sagoff, have
suggested nonpecuniary benefits of a strict wilderness concept
which should be added to the pecuniary benefits already mentioned.14"oth present their ideas to get away from a utilitarian
(cost-benefit) justification for wilderness protection which they
fear will be too ephemeral to justify permanently preserving our
natural environs.lWAlthough, as will be shown, neither seems to
succeed in his effort to escape utilitarianism, each points out
benefits which should be included in any cost-benefit analysis.
In Ways Not T o Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law,lJ1Tribe argues that a "homocentric
want-oriented perspective,"lJ2 which Sagoff correctly labels utilitarian,153must be abandoned if a permanent basis for wilderness
preservation is to be
Tribe maintains that this homocentric perspective leads the environmentalist into the trap of "articulating environmental goals wholly in terms of human needs and
preferences."lJ5 His concern is that as human wants and needs
148. This type of analysis may also be used to suggest an optimal amount of leniently
managed wilderness land.
149. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE
L.J. 205 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Sagoff]; Tribe, Ways Not T o Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALEL.J. 1315 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tribe].
While a t first glance it may appear that one of the most important nonpecuniary
justifications for wilderness preservation is beauty, Sagoff argues that "[elven if nature
in the rough were beautiful, this would not be an adequate reason to protect it from
development." Sagoff 245. Tribe also suggests that the appearance of the natural environment will not provide a justification for saving it. Tribe 1316 (plastic trees can provide
most people with the feeling they are experiencing nature). Beauty therefore will not be
discussed as a nonpecuniary reason for wilderness preservation.
150. See notes 154 & 163 and accompanying text infra.
151. Tribe.
152. The homocentric want-oriented perspective is that value system which treats
human needs and desires as the ultimate frame of reference for making social decisions
and which Sagoff correctly labels utilitarian. See note 153 infra.
153. Sagoff 215.
154. Tribe 1331.
155. Id. at 1330.
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presently filled by the wilderness become artificially satisfied our
commitment to wilderness preservation will erode. He therefore
suggests that a more enduring basis for preserving the natural
environment is needed and proposes that one can be found in the
interests of nonhuman entities. 15'
But considering nonhuman interests does not result in a nonutilitarian justification for wilderness preservation. Instead, nonhuman interests merely comprise another variable to be included
in the utility calculus.158While these interests ought to be given
some weight and would undoubtedly weigh in favor of preservation, they are at best difficult to calculate and can only be calculated by human beings who will use them to promote human
interests. Thus, they are subject to the same weaknesses as the
human wants and needs Tribe disparages as justifications for
protection efforts. 1 5 ~
Sagoff, in On Preserving the Natural E n v i r ~ n m e n t pre,~~~
sents a different justification for wilderness preservation:lsl
Preserving an environment may be compared to maintaining an
institution, for symbols are to values as institutions are to our
legal and political life. The obligation to preserve nature, then,
156. Tribe states:
By treating individual human need and desire as the ultimate frame of
reference, and by assuming that human goals and ends must be taken as externally "given" (whether physiologically or culturally or both) rather than genericated by reason, environmental policy makes a value judgment of enormous significance. And, once that judgment has been made, any claim for the continued
existence of threatened wilderness areas or endangered species must rest on the
identification of human wants and needs which would be jeopardized by a
disputed development. As our capacity increases to satisfy those needs and
wants artifically, the claim becomes tenuous indeed.
Id. a t 1326.
157. Id. at 1345.
158. See id. As Sagoff points out, Tribe concludes that "the interests of all entities
affected by a policy must be taken into account." Sagoff 223. Sagoff correctly explains
that the only difference between the "homocentric want-oriented perspective" Tribe is
disparaging and Tribe's approach is that Tribe's approach is not homocentric. Tribe
merely broadens the range of interests to be included in the utility calculus. Id. at 21519.
159. See generally Sagoff 223. Interestingly, one of Sagoffs arguments against Tribe
is the animals and plants may prefer a nonnatural environment. Id. But the argument
seems less than compelling in view of the numerous species which have dwindled or
perished as a result of the encroachment of man upon their environs.
160. Sagoff.
161. Sagoff states: "As long as policies are intended to maximize the general satisfaction, they will be no better, morally or spiritually, than the interests they serve.'' Id. a t
225. Sagoffs concern, therefore, is similar to that expressed by Tribe with regard to a
utilitarian justification for wilderness preservation: that is, that the obligation to the
wilderness will fade as interests change.
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is an obligation to our cultural tradition, to the values which we
have cherished and in terms of which nature and this nation are
still to be described. 162

He then states why he consideres this view to be nonutilitarian:
It is difficult and indeed unnecessary to argue that fulfilling
this obligation to our national values, to our history, and, therefore, to ourselves confers any kind of a benefit; perhaps fulfilling
a responsibility is itself a benefit; but this view requires not that
we define "responsibility" in terms of "benefits," as the utilitarian does, but that we define "benefits" in terms of "responsibilities." In any case, preservation of the qualities, and accordingly the values, that this nation, as a nation, has considered
pecularily its own-and these are the qualities of nature-certainly obliges us to do otherwise than follow our pleasure and profit. Consequently, there may be reason to think that
fidelity to our historic values imposes both a "benefit" and a
"COSt."163

Indeed, there are costs and benefits in the preservation of values,
just as any analysis of the merits of wilderness preservation itself
reveals costs and benefits. What Sagoff has really performed is a
cost-benefit analysis of value preservation to conclude, on balance, that preserving values is worthwhile and that the wilderness, because it is a symbol of our national values, should be
preserved. His discussion of defining "benefits" in terms of "responsibilities" rather than "responsibilities" in terms of "benefits," even if persuasive, seems irrelevant to the conclusion that
preserving a symbol of our national values is beneficial. Thus,
Sagoff supplies us with yet another variable to include in the
utility calculus-value preservation.ls4
While Tribe and Sagoff may not have escaped utilitarianism,
it may be the nonpecuniary benefits they point out that tip the
balance in favor of maintaining a pure wilderness concept. In
making this determination, however, it is recognized that a time
may come when, because of an increased scarcity of goods obtainable only by activities incompatible with a strict concept of wilderness preservation, cost-benefit analysis yields a far different
result than it does today.
162. Sagoff 265.
163. Id.
164. Paradoxically, Sagoffs argument that the wilderness ought to be preserved for
nonutilitarian reasons is not persuasive unless one is convinced that the preservation effort
would be beneficial.
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B. A Two- Tiered Wilderness Concept
The analysis presented above indicates the probability that
preservation of a limited amount of wilderness in its pristine state
is justified. That same analysis could also be used to demonstrate
the merit in preserving additional areas in which limited comThus, a
mercial development would be, or has been al10wed.l~~
two-tiered wilderness system composed of what could be labeled
Grade I and Grade I1 wilderness areas is in order. Grade I areas
would include lands to be maintained according to strict wilderness standards. Grade I1 areas would include lands in which all
uses allowed under section 4 of the present Actle6would be permissible, both before and after inclusion within the system. The
Grade I1 classification would impose stricter requirements than
the present Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act16' in that wilderness preservation would be the prevailing administrative objective rather than just one of many considerations governing administration.
Clearly, cost-benefit analysis could be utilized to determine
not only whether specific lands should be included in the wilderness system, but also whether those lands would be better suited
for Grade I or Grade I1 classification. Thus, lands containing
resources of high commercial value as well as desirable wilderness
qualities would probably be suited for Grade I1 classification,
while lands with little commercial potential and high wilderness
value would certainly be reserved for Grade I status. This twotiered concept is preferable to the exclusive application of either
a strict or a lenient wilderness concept because it recognizes and
preserves the wilderness characteristics of essentially primeval,
though somewhat commercially exploited lands, while at the
same time maintaining other primitive lands according to the
strictest wilderness definition.
OF THE ACT: SOME
SUGGESTIONS
VII. THEFUTURE

With the expiration of the Act's 10 year period for review of
potential wilderness areas, Congress now has the opportunity to
review the provisions of the Act and to make necessary adjustments. In light of the foregoing discussion, the following changes
appear desirable:
165. See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 129-31 and accompanying text supra.
167. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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(1) The administrative agencies should be provided with
guidelines which clearly define the criteria to be considered in
reviewing areas for designation as wilderness. This would eliminate, to a degree, the large amount of agency discretion in the
review process and would foster uniformity in decisions concerning which areas are to be included within the NWPS . This suggestion, of course, has little importance unless Congress decides that
there is merit in considering lands besides those set aside for
review in the original Act.
(2) The definition of "contiguous" should be clarified so
that review of all areas in reasonable proximity to primitive areas
is undertaken. Lands defined to be contiguous to a primitive area
should include all those adjacent to the primitive area possessing
the same ecological and geographical characteristics as the primitive area, whether or not those lands actually share common
boundaries with the primitive area.
(3) The Act should specify that all lands mandated for review under the Act, including contiguous areas, are to be protected against all nonwilderness uses until such time as Congress
acts on the Presidential recommendations regarding their wilderness suitability.
(4) The Wilderness Act should be broadened to require the
study of those lands which were not mandated for review under
the original Act, but which possess significant wilderness characteristics.
(5) An amendment should be seriously considered which
would impose a time frame within which Congress must act on
the affirmative recommendations of the President. Failure of
Congress to act within the specified period, i. e . , 120 days, would
result in the automatic inclusion of the recommended area within
the NWPS. This amendment appears especially appropriate in
light of the fact that few, if any, Presidential recommendations
have been disapproved by Congress. Such an amendment would
do much to expedite the inclusion of lands into the NWPS and
thereby reduce problems associated with protection of the lands
pending review, recommendation, and congressional enactment.
(6) The Wilderness Act should be amended to establish a
two-tiered wilderness system-establishing Grade I and Grade 11
wilderness areas-in place of the one level system which now
exists. Grade I areas would be strictly maintained so that no use
incompatible with pristine wilderness conditions would be permitted. Grade I1 areas would not be as stringently maintained.
Activities such as water reclamation, the use of power equipment

THE WILDERNESS ACT

7271

755

(such as motorboats and helicopters), mining, and logging would
be permitted, although closely regulated and limited. Loggedover forests could in included in Grade I1 areas under some circumstances. Each area would be classified on the basis of a separate cost-benefit analysis.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Although a product of considerable compromise, the Wilderness Act of 1964 has worked admirably well in the 11years since
its passage. The review procedures have been substantially complied with and the NWPS has been greatly enlarged in 26 states.
There have been some problems, however, both with the procedural aspects of the Act and with the Act's concept of wilderness preservation. Since the 10 year review process has ended,
now is an appropriate time for Congress to take a critical look a t
these deficiencies and to amend the Act accordingly. The establishment of a two-tiered wilderness sytem would do much to eliminate the inconsistencies in the Act and to satisfy, at least in part,
the preservationists as well as those representing commercial enterprises.
APPENDIX
A
Areas of the National Forest System Included in the
National Wilderness Preservation System

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

State

Name of Area

Alabama
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arkansas
Arkansas
Arkansas
Arkansas
Arkansas
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California

Sipsey
Chiricahua
Sierra Andia
Mazatzal
Superstition
Galiuro
Mt. Baldy
Sycamore Canyon
Pine Mountain
Caney Creek
Upper Buffalo
Belle Starr Cave
Dry Creek
Richland Creek
Marble Mtn.
Yolla Middle Ecl
South Warner
Thousand Lakes
Cucamongan
San Gorgonia
Hoover
San Jacinto

Acreage

Year Entered Public Law

756

BFUGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
California
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Florida
Florida
Georgia
Idaho,
Montana
Idaho
Idaho
Kentucky
Michigan
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Nevada
New Hamp.
New Hamp.
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
No. Carolina
No. Carolina
No. Carolina
No. Carolina
No. Carolina
Oregon
Oregon
Oreeon
.2

Caribou
Desolation
Minarets
John Muir
Dome Land
Mikelumne
Yolla Bolly-Middle
Ecl
San Gabriel
San Rafael
Ventana
Agua Tibia
Emigrant
Mount Zirkel
West Elk
Rawah
La Garita
Maroon Bells-Snow
Mass
Weminuche
Sopchoppy River
Bradwell Bay
Cohutta
Selway-Bitterroot
Sawtooth
Hells Canyon
Beaver Creek
Rock River Canyon
Sturgeon River
Boundary Waters
Canoe Area
Bob Marshall
Scapegoat
Cabinet Mountains
Anaconda-Piutlar
Gates of the Mts.
Mission Mountains
Jarbridge
Great Gulf
Presidential RangeDry River
Wheeler Peak
Pecos
Gila
San Pedro Parks
White Mountain
Linville Gorge
Shining Rock
Craggy Mountain
Joyce KilmerSlickrock
Ellicott Rock
Mountain Lakes
Eagle Cap
Mount Hood
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Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
So. Carolina
Tennessee
Tennessee
Tennessee
Vermont
Vermont
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Washington
Washington
Washington
Washington
W. Virginia
W. Virginia
W. Virginia
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming

Three Sisters
Strawberry Mountain
Gearhart Mountain
Kalmiopsis
Diamond Peak
Mount Washington
Mount Jefferson
Wambaw Swamp
Gee Creek
Big Frog
Citico Creek
Bristol Cliffs
Lye Brook
James River Face
Mill Creek
Mountain Lake
Peters Mountain
Ramsey's Draft
Glacier Peak
Mt. Adams
Goat Rocks
Pasayten
Cranberry
Dolly Sods
Otter Creek
Rainbow Lake
Flynn Lake
Round Lake
Bridger
North Absaroka
Washakie
Teton

B
APPENDIX
Part I
Areas of the National Park System Included in the
National Wilderness Preservation System
State

Area

3.

Arizona
California
California

4.

Idaho

Petrified Forest
Lava Beds
Lassen Volcanic
National Park
Craters of the Moon

1.
2.

Acreage

Year

Pub. Law

50,260
28,460
78,982

1970
1972
1972

91-504
92-493
92-510

43,243

1970

91-504

Part I1
Areas of the National Park System Proposed for Inclusion in the
National Wilderness Preservation System

1.

2.
3.

State

Area

Alaska
Alaska
Alaska

Katmai
Glacier Bay
Mount McKinley

Proposed Acreage
2,792,137.00
2,803,840.00
1,939,492.80
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Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona, Utah
Arizona
Arizona, Nevada
Arkansas
California
California
California
California
California
California
California,
Nevada
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado, Utah
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Florida, Miss.
Florida
Florida
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Hawaii
Idaho, Montana,
Wyoming
Kentucky
Kentucky, Virginia,
Tennessee
Michigan
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
North Dakota
North Carolina
North Carolina,
Tennessee
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
Oregon
South Dakota
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Wupatki
Saguaro
Organ Pipe Cactus
Grand Canyon
Glen Canyon
Chiricahu
Lake Mead
Buffalo
Yosemite
Sequoia
Point Reyes
Pinnacles
Kings Canyon
Joshua Tree
Death Valley
Black Canyon of the Gunnison
Colorado
Dinosaur
Great Sand Dunes
Mesa Verde
Rocky Mountain
Gulf Islands
Everglades
Canaveral
Big Cypress
Cumberland Island
Haleakala
Hawaii Volcanoes
Yellowstone
Mammoth Cave
Cumberland Gap
Sleeping Bear Dunes
Isle Royale
Voyageurs
Glacier
Theodore Roosevelt
Cape Lookout
Great Smoky Mountains
Carlsbad Caverns
Chaco Canyon
Bandelier
White Sands
Crater Lake
Badlands
Big Bend
Big Thicket
Guadalupe Mountains
Padre Island
Zion
Arches
Bryce Canyon
Canyonlands
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Utah
Utah
Virginia,
Maryland
Virginia
Washington
Washington
Washington
Wyoming

Capitol Reef
Cedar Breaks
Assateague
Shenandoah
Mount Rainier
North Cascades
Olympic
Grand Teton

Part I
Areas of the National Wildlife Refuge System Included
in the National Wilderness Preservation System
State

Area

Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
California
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Georgia
Georgia, Fla.
Georgia
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
New Jersey
New Jersey
New Mexico
New Mexico
North Dakota
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Oregon
So. Carolina
Washington
Wisconsin

Bering Sea
Bogoslof
Chamisso
Forrester Island
Hazy Islands
Saint Lazaria
Tuxedni
Farallon
Cedar Keys
Florida Keys
Island Bay
Passage Key
Pelican Island
St. Marks
Blackbeard
Okefenokee
Wolf Island
Breton
Moosehorn
Monomoy
Huron Islands
Michigan Islands
Seney
Brigantine
Great Swamp
Bosque del Apache
Salt Creek
Chase Lake
Lostwood
West Sister Island
Wichita Mountains
Oregon Islands
Three Arch Rocks
Cape Romain
Washington Islands
Wisconsin Islands

Acreage

Year

Public Law
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Part I1
Areas of the National Wildlife Refuge System Proposed
for Inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation Program
State

Area

Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Arizona
Arizona,
Calif.
Arizona,
Calif.
Arizona
Arkansas
Arkansas
Delaware
Florida
Florida
Florida
Hawaii
Illinois
Iowa, Minnesota,
Illinois & Wisconsin
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nevada
Nevada

Aleutian Islands
Kenai
Izembek
Nunivak
Semidi
Simenof
Unimak
Cabeza Prieta
Havasu

Nevada
Nevada
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
Oregon
Oregon

Imperial
Kofa
Big Lake
White River
Bombay Hook
Chassahowitzka
J. N. "Ding" Darling
Lake Woodruff
Hawaiian Islands
Crab Orchard
Upper Mississippi
Lacassine
Parker River
Agassiz
Mille Lacs
Rice Lake
Tamarac
Noxubee
Mingo
Charles M. Russell
Medicine Lake
Red Rock Lakes
U. L. Bend
Crescent Lake
Fort Niobrara
Valentine
Anaho Island
Charles Sheldon Antelope
Range
Sheldon National Antelope
Refuge
Desert
Cedar Island
Mattarnuskeet
Pea Island
Swanquarter
Hart Mountain
Malheur

Proposed Acreage
1,395,357
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46.
47.
48.
49.

Oregon
South Carolina
Vermont
Washington

Oregon Islands
Santee
Missisquoi
San Juan Islands

